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... A Rendezvous with Kreplach
Putting the New Deal Court in Context
G. Edward White
The Constitution and the New Deal
Harvard 2000

Richard D. Friedman

T

he Supreme Court of the New Deal
era continues to captivate lawyers and
historians. Constitutional jurisprudence changed rapidly during the period.
Moreover, some of the most significant
changes seemed – whatever the reality – to
result from pressure imposed in 1937 by President Franklin Roosevelt’s plan to pack the
Court. The structure of constitutional law that
emerged within a few years of Roosevelt’s death
remains intact in significant respects today.
The New Deal period therefore presents
significant issues of continuing interest: How
does constitutional law change, over the short
and long runs? To what extent are Supreme
Court justices’ decisions influenced not only
by their own ideological orientations but also
by political pressures of the type that are ordinarily imposed on the other branches of government – and to what extent should their

decisions be influenced by such pressures?
Professor G. Edward White, one of our
most distinguished legal historians, has contributed to this discourse with his thoughtful
book, The Constitution and the New Deal. Some
readers may be perplexed to find that substantial portions of the book do not deal with the
Constitution, that much of it does not concern
the New Deal, and that only relatively small
portions of it address constitutional issues that
were particularly salient during the New Deal.
But the book is very much about setting a
context, and part of White’s point is that the
importance of the New Deal as an engine
driving constitutional change has been considerably overstated.
As White explains, the conventional
account of early twentieth-century constitutional history characterizes the New Deal “as
the source of a new era of constitutional law

Richard Friedman is the Ralph W. Aigler Collegiate Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School.
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and constitutional interpretation, in which the
Constitution was adapted to facilitate a new
realm of American governance” marked by
affirmative roles for state and federal governments as regulators of the economy and
distributors of economic benefits (p. 3). This
new era envisioned a new role for judges.
Applying what White calls “bifurcated review,”
they accord considerable leeway to the political
branches in exercising their regulatory and
distributive functions, but at the same time
carefully scrutinize laws and policies that
might infringe on rights and liberties “deemed
foundational to a democratic modern society”
(pp. 3-4). In the conventional account,
Roosevelt’s landslide victory in 1936 and the
Court-packing plan of the following year are
perceived as instrumental in causing dramatic
constitutional change (p. 14). Thus, in one
modern version of the conventional account,
Bruce Ackerman presents “a radical discontinuity between the decades that preceded the
New Deal and the New Deal itself,” which
“helps highlight the New Deal’s transformative
character” (p. 27).
White contends that the causal relationship
of doctrinal changes in constitutional law to
the New Deal “was far more complicated, and
attenuated, than existing scholarship has
suggested” (p. 4). In some areas change was
under way long before the New Deal period,
and was not resolved until later. And the
Court’s development of bifurcated review also
occurred over a far longer period than has
usually been supposed (p. 4). Furthermore,
events of the early twentieth century have been
seen so much through the perspective of the
New Deal that juridical perspectives that were
perfectly respectable in the earlier time have
since been pilloried, as have the justices who

advocated them (pp. 14-15, 269-70, 288-91).
To a large extent, I agree with White. We
should do away with the oft-used term
“constitutional revolution of 1937.” Perhaps the
transformation in constitutional law that
occurred during the 1930s and 1940s
constituted a revolution; as White recognizes
(p. 199), it was broad, deep, and, in historical
terms, rapid. And in 1937, in the shadow of
Roosevelt’s re-election and the Court-packing
plan, the Court did issue several significant
decisions that were key parts of that transformation. But they were far from the whole story,
they had significant antecedents that long preceded the Court-packing plan, and there is no
persuasive evidence that they were caused by
the politics surrounding Roosevelt’s initiative.1
I agree, moreover, with White’s principal
historiographic conclusion: The persistence of
belief that political factors must have caused
the Court’s 1937 decisions is a puzzle to which a
crucial key is the widely held belief among
many academics that justices are basically
political actors responding to ordinary political
forces. White is correct, for example, that
Laura Kalman’s intellectual presuppositions
prevent her from “giv[ing] much credence to a
theory of constitutional change that appears to
minimize the deeply behavioral character of
judging and the apparently inevitable tendency
of constitutional law to become subsumed in
politics” (p. 31). From the perspective of scholars like Kalman and William Leuchtenburg,
“to emphasize the role of established legal ideas
and doctrines as causative factors is to invite
the revival of an older, unreflective caricature of
judging as an apolitical process” (p. 31).
In considering White’s stance and contribution, it might help to bear in mind the attempts
by Kalman and others to distinguish between

1 This is a theme that Barry Cushman and I have both pursued, Cushman most notably in Rethinking
the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (1998), and I in
Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891 (1994).
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“internalists, who point to doctrinal, intellectual causes in explaining constitutional change
during the New Deal, and externalists, who
stress political reasons.”2 (Kalman places me in
the internalist camp.) To my mind, the dichotomy is a false one. On the one hand, if we want
to understand constitutional change we must
pay attention to doctrinal constraints; to
assume that constitutional law is nothing but a
reflection of the various political, intellectual,
and social forces swirling through society
would ignore the reality that at any given
moment the justices’ plausible options are
significantly constrained by the web woven by
prior decisions. On the other hand, it would be
equally unrealistic to ignore those forces and
treat the Court as if it were hermetically sealed
from the outside world. Indeed, the chief
generator of constitutional change is probably
created by the closest interface the Court has
with the external, political world – the appointment of new justices.
White helps bridge the gap between
internalist and externalist explanations. Put
another way, he pays attention, appropriately,
to both internal and external forces. He treats
doctrine seriously, and indeed much of the
book concerns doctrinal changes in constitutional and non-constitutional law in the first
half of the twentieth century. At the same time,
he places those changes in the broad social context of modernism, “a distinctive consciousness
that has shaped the responses of Americans to
their encounters with modern life” (p. 5). As
White uses the term, modernism is reflected in
“an attitude that elevates human agency, as
distinguished from potent external forces, to a
position of causal primacy in the universe, and
thus takes for granted that humans are capable
of controlling their environment and shaping
their collective destinies” (p. 5).

After outlining the conventional account
and its modernist underpinnings, White
begins by examining three areas that, as he
says, “lie somewhere on the periphery of the
conventional narrative’s focus” (p. 12) – the constitutional law of foreign affairs, administrative
law, and free speech. He does so, he says,
because by showing that the law in all of these
areas changed substantially and relatively
gradually before the New Deal era or the
Court-packing crisis, he “hope[s] to engender
an attitude of skepticism toward the conventional account’s treatment of its central areas of
concern” (p. 12). In terms used by his colleague
Barry Cushman, his aim is “to create sufficient
intellectual space” for an alternative account.3
Foreign Affairs. It is noteworthy, as White
emphasizes, that George Sutherland, perhaps
the most theoretically astute member of the
Court’s conservative foursome in the crisis
years, took advanced ground early on (long
before joining the Court) in advocating plenary
federal power and broad executive discretion in
foreign affairs. But Sutherland himself carefully distinguished the foreign and domestic
contexts, and on the Court he rigorously
adhered to the distinction.4 Sutherland was
able to write his theory into law in the international context, but neither in his hands nor in
those of any of his colleagues did this theory
provide a basis for overcoming limitations on
powers of the federal government, or of the
executive, in the domestic context.
Administrative Law. What White calls the
conventional account associates orthodox constitutional objections to the growth of agency
government with resistance to the expansion of
government more generally. Key to this
account is the sequence of three decisions in
1935 and 1936 that struck down federal statutes
in part on the ground that they constituted

2 Law, Politics, and the New Deals, 108 Yale L.J. 2165, 2165 (1999).
3 Barry Cushman, supra note 1, at 5.
4 See p. 71, noting Sutherland’s adherence to the distinction in the Carter Coal and Curtiss-Wright cases.
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excessive delegations of legislative power to
agencies, uncurbed by judicial-like procedures.5 And the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946 reflected the triumph of
a newer model, with relatively slight restraints
on agency action. At least the first parts of this
conventional account seem sound to me: To a
large extent, those who generally resisted
expanded governmental power also resisted
delegation of legislative power, but the increasing appeal of the agency form in an environment that demanded increased governmental
activity swamped the objections. Nevertheless,
White appears correct in arguing that the
orthodox constitutional objections to the
agency form played a significant role, and a far
greater one than is often acknowledged, in
shaping the administrative law that eventually
emerged.6 Thus, embedded in our modern
administrative law there may be more than is
commonly supposed of the thinking of early
twentieth-century analysts of the emergence of
agencies. That is an interesting point, though
its force in helping to explain the constitutional
transformation that centered on the New Deal
era strikes me as rather small.
Free Speech. White examines the development of free speech jurisprudence together
with the emergence of the system of bifurcated
review, under which the Court explicitly
defers much more to the political branches in
some contexts than in others. He contrasts

bifurcated review with an older model he calls
“guardian review,” under which judges stood
“as guardians and appliers of a realm of prepolitical, essentialist constitutional principles”
(p. 4). White draws two conclusions that he
says are “perhaps unexpected.” First, he says,
“[t]he New Deal and the Court-packing crisis
had very little causal connection to the emergence of free speech” (p. 163). I would not have
thought this conclusion unexpected. On the
contrary, free speech issues were sufficiently
removed from the focus of attention of the
New Deal that the contrary conclusion might
have been surprising – except to the extent
that it can be said that the increased stature of
free speech rights was a result of the infusion
of Roosevelt appointees on the Court beginning in 1937, a factor that White does not
analyze closely. White is correct in arguing
that free speech rights had come to be treated
as having significant constitutional and cultural weight before the 1930s, and that “Court
majorities had shown evidence of developing a
speech-protective jurisprudence between 1931
and early 1937” (p. 163). Nevertheless, it seems
highly likely that personnel changes accounted
for a good deal of the change in the Court’s
decisions.7
White’s second conclusion relates to the oftdiscussed footnote 4 in Justice Stone’s opinion
for the Court in United States v. Carolene Products
Co.8 White says that “the emergence of free

5 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 236 (1936).
6 White points to the requirements that agencies publish their decisions; that administrative officials
cannot combine prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions; and that affected persons must have an
opportunity to comment on prospective decisions or an opportunity to challenge them judicially.
7 Note, for instance, the ideological breakdown in a trio of cases from the spring of 1931. Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (McReynolds and Butler, JJ., dissenting from pro-speech decision); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (Hoover’s two appointees, Hughes and Roberts, providing crucial votes for
a pro-speech decision over dissents of the conservative four); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605 (Roberts joining conservative four to reject freedom of conscience claim). White does briefly
consider the impact of personnel changes on the switch between Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940), and West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943).
8 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Stone wrote for the Court but, as White points out, only a minority of the
justices subscribed to the portion of the opinion including the footnote. Justice Cardozo, who was
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speech bore a significant connection to the
famous footnote in Carolene Products and, more
fundamentally, to the substitution of bifurcated review for guardian review as the
approved stance for judges in twentiethcentury constitutional cases” (p. 163). He
shows nicely that heightened review emerged
in the context of free speech and associated
rights, and only later figured prominently in
the context of the protection of minorities, and
that free speech cases provided the bulk of
support for the footnote. But as for his causal
claim – that “it was crucial to the development
of bifurcated constitutional review” that free
speech rights had already come to be regarded
as liberties with significant constitutional and
cultural weight (p. 163) – I am less sure. If
White’s point is that free speech cases, which
happened to provide most of the precedential
support for the footnote, also – and more

importantly – supplied one of the critical footings for the development of deferential review,
the proposition is certainly an interesting one
and perhaps it is right. One may well speculate,
though, that bifurcated review would have
developed soon enough in the context of racial
discrimination even if the First Amendment
were not part of the Constitution at all. To the
extent, if any, that he means that free speech
cases were important for the development of
bifurcated review because they provided support for the footnote, I am dubious. Though it
has become a canonical vehicle for discourse
about appropriate standards of review, I suspect that the Carolene footnote actually had
very little generative significance.9
White does not discuss the origin of the
footnote.10 Stone’s clerk, Louis Lusky, drafted
what eventually became the last two paragraphs. Hughes expressed concern about the

mortally ill, and Justice Reed, who presumably was recused, did not participate in the case; Black
concurred in the opinion except for this portion of it; Butler concurred in the judgment in a separate
opinion; and McReynolds dissented.
9 In the years shortly after it was issued, the footnote was cited principally in separate opinions, rather
than in opinions for the Court. But see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (“Abridgment of
freedom of speech and of the press ... impairs those opportunities for public education that are
essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular
government.”); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941) (citing the footnote
in a string of cases for the proposition that, “as we have frequently indicated,” the right to free
discussion “is to be guarded with a jealous eye”). Most of the citations were for narrow, often
uncontested points, and most remained within the free speech context. See Minersville School Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting) (“prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities”); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring) (“limits to the
extent to which the presumption of constitutionality can be pressed, especially where the liberty of
the person is concerned”); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“This Court has recognized, what hardly could be denied, that all the
provisions of the first ten Amendments are ‘specific’ prohibitions ...”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 173 (1944) ( Jackson, J., dissenting) (“strong presumption of the constitutionality” of
statutes does not apply in favor of statutes that “directly or indirectly infringe religious freedom and
the right of parents to encourage their children in the practice of a religious belief ”); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 466  n.13 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citing the portion of Carolene
including the footnote, along with another case, for “the general presumption of validity which
attaches to legislation”). The first extensive discussion of the footnote in a Supreme Court opinion
was in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-92 (1949) (saying that
the footnote “stirred inquiry” regarding degree of scrutiny for legislation touching on Bill of Rights
and Fourteenth Amendment, but that it “merely rephrased and expanded what was said in Herndon
v. Lowry, [301 U.S. 242 (1937)] and elsewhere”).
10 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 275, 302 n.65 (1988).
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talk of “different considerations” and different standards of review applying in different
circumstances. The difference, he said, was
not one in the test but in the nature of the
right invoked. Stone, in an attempt to
accommodate this concern (which he seems
to have misunderstood) tacked on the first
paragraph of the footnote, which speaks of
“narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution.”
Interestingly, it is only the argument in this
paragraph, and not those in the other two,
that White says “was a common part of the
discourse of constitutional jurisprudence in
1938” (p. 163).
I must confess that in reading White’s
chapters on foreign affairs, administrative law,
and free speech, I thought of the story told me
by my old colleague Leo Katz about the boy
who had an irrational fear of kreplach, a Jewish
dumpling that makes many mouths water. His
mother, determined to overcome the problem,
showed him the ingredients. “See,” she said,
“this is just meat and dough.” The boy watched
with equanimity as his mother folded one
corner of the dough over the meat, and then a
second and a third. Then the mother folded
over the final corner. The boy’s face turned red.
“Kreplach!” he screamed, and ran in terror
from the room.
Three folds make an interesting exercise,
but they only bring us to the periphery of the
problem; until the fourth fold, the meat and
dough just aren’t kreplach. Similarly, it is very
well to show that in various doctrinal areas that
lie “somewhere on the periphery” of the issues
that were most pressing during the crisis of the
1930s, the law had already changed gradually
and substantially, and White does a fine job of
showing that it had. But this is not particularly
surprising, and as long as one loiters on the
edges of the central topic – government’s power
to regulate economic relations – it is hard to get

458

much of a handle on the question that is of
chief interest: Why did the Court make (or at
least give the appearance of making) such a dramatic shift on that issue after Roosevelt issued
his plan? To answer that question, one must
delve into the cases actually dealing with economic regulation.
White moves tentatively towards the heart
of the matter in a chapter on a topic that still
seems far removed from economic regulation:
the formation of the American Law Institute
and the launching of its Restatement project
in the 1920s. Drawing on but adjusting
Langdellian orthodoxies of the late nineteenth
century, the ali “separate[d] the essentialist
authority of the black letter principles being
compiled by authors of Restatement volumes
from the expertise-based authority of the
compilers” (p. 181). The premise that such a
separation was possible exposed the ali to
modernist-inspired criticism from the Legal
Realists, who contended that the whole
project was incoherent and that it failed to
recognize the importance of human agency in
the development of law. To a typical Realist,
“science” in law “was contextual rather than
conceptual, behavioral rather than taxonomic”
(p. 191).
The same debate, as White shows, played
out in the constitutional context and accounts
in large part for the commitment of many
scholars to the view that the Court-packing
crisis played a critical role in leading to the
constitutional transformation of the 1930s
and 1940s. The conventional account, taking
the Realist perspective, accepts a “behavioralist view of judges as constitutional interpreters” and “rejects, as antiquated or misguided,
any conception ... that treats the authority of
the Constitution’s text as separate from the
authority of those given the power to interpret it” (p. 200). This account is, he says, a
“triumphalist narrative” (p. 237), for in the
1930s “the proposition that judges, in their
role as constitutional interpreters, made law
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in the legislative sense ... worked its way from
the status of critique to something approaching orthodoxy” (pp. 234-35). Thus, in an
interesting and useful twist, White sees the
Court-packing crisis not as a cause of revolution but “as a product of a constitutional revolution, one whose revolutionary character
was far deeper and wider than any ‘switch in
time’” (p. 235).
The argument is a valuable one, but I believe
White takes it too far, and in two directions.
First, even before the 1930s, the role of judicial
ideology in determining constitutional law was
well understood. And second, the justices who
actually effected the constitutional transformation of that era did not view prior law as placing
no constraints on them.
There probably never was a time when the
impact of ideology on the justices’ shaping of
constitutional law was not well understood, at
least by attentive observers. Consider two
statements that have become clichés, both
dating to the first decade of the twentieth century. “[N]o matther whether th’ constitution
follows th’ flag or not,” Mr. Dooley told his
friend Hennessy in 1901, “th’ supreme coort
follows th’ iliction returns.”11 And six years
later, the Republican Governor of New York,
Charles Evans Hughes, declared, “We are
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is
what the judges say it is ... .”12 Nominations to
the Supreme Court in the years surrounding
the Civil War frequently aroused fierce, ideological opposition.13 By the early years of the
twentieth century, as the great issues that had

divided the nation receded, the process had
generally become more routine – but not
always. Mahlon Pitney in 1912, and Hughes
and John J. Parker in 1930, faced significant,
ideologically based, opposition from the left –
in Parker’s case, enough to defeat his nomination, based on the perception that he was racist
and anti-labor. Opposition to nominees was
not limited to insurgents. The 1916 battle over
Louis Brandeis (barely mentioned by White,
and only in another context) was, with the
possible exception of the one over Robert Bork
in 1987, the hottest and most ideological
nomination contest of the century. The resistance to Brandeis came from the right, was
deeply ideological, and was led by pillars of the
legal establishment – including Elihu Root,
William Howard Taft, and five other former
presidents of the American Bar Association.14
And conservative justices like Taft and James
McReynolds constantly worried about the
impact of more liberal judges.15
But to say that ideology matters is not to say
that it is all that matters. Indeed, the most
genuinely realistic view, while recognizing that
a justice is not completely constrained by text
and precedent, does not fail to recognize that
these factors do have considerable force. Whatever some commentators of the what-thejudge-had-for-breakfast school might say, the
justices themselves have never treated doctrine
as if it counted for naught. Thus, I believe
White goes too far in saying that “the Supreme
Court justices themselves ... concluded that
there was no intelligible distinction between

11 Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley’s Opinions 26 (1901).
12 Charles E. Hughes, Addresses of Charles Evans Hughes 185 (1908) (speech of May 3, 1907).
13 I discuss this in Richard D. Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court
Nominations: From Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1983).
14 See generally A.L. Todd, Justice on Trial: The Case of Louis D. Brandeis (1968).
15 Note, for example, McReynolds’ characterization of Brandeis as “consciously boring from within.”
Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 258 (1956). In his declining
years, Taft was determined to stay on the Court as long as possible “to prevent the Bolsheviki from
getting control.” Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice 294 (1965).
Anticipating his departure from the Court, he wrote Butler in 1929, “With Van and Mac and
Sutherland and you and Sanford, there will be five to steady the boat ... .” Id. at 296.
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the authority of legal sources and that of their
designated interpreters” (p. 233).
Consider first Holmes’s famous dissent in
Lochner v. New York.16 White discusses the
dissent in some detail in a chapter attempting
to recast the history of substantive due process
cases that makes some interesting points but
that, in my opinion, does not substantially
undercut the conventional account. Lochner
was, of course, decided long before the 1930s,
but White correctly points out that it was a
critical symbol for later judges who shared
Holmes’s modernist perspective (pp. 245,
267). And yet Holmes suggested that the
Fourteenth Amendment could invalidate legislation if “a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would
infringe fundamental principles as they have
been understood by our traditions and our
law.” This passage reflects the existence of a
distinction between source of law and interpreter, and in large part for that reason White
treats the dissent as a largely conventional
“guardian review” opinion (pp. 245-46). But I
believe this treatment reflects the malleability
of White’s concept of guardian review.17 What
is most distinctive about Holmes’s dissent is
its frank recognition of the breadth of legislative power, a conception that was consistent in

his mind with the existence of some unalterable principles of law. And so it was in the
minds of his successors. Notably, White does
not suggest that any of the justices who later
turned the Holmes dissent into a manifesto
for their modernist approach ever expressed
any difficulty with this passage.
Consider next the following statement by
Justice Roberts, one of the most notorious
articulations of that distinction between
source and interpreter but – surprisingly, especially given that he analyzes numerous texts at
length – one that White never addresses:
It is sometimes said that the court assumes a
power to overrule or control the action of the
people’s representatives. This is a misconception. ... When an act of Congress is
appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate, the
judicial branch of the government has only one
duty; to lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the latter
squares with the former. All the court does, or
can do, is to announce its considered judgment
upon the question. The only power it has, if
such it may be called, is the power of
judgment. This court neither approves nor
condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate
and difficult office is to ascertain and declare
whether the legislation is in accordance with,

16 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17 White makes the interesting point that the term “substantive due process” is a latter-day creation, and
I believe he is right that by the 1950s narratives of the rise and fall of substantive due process “had
taken on the elements of a morality play” (p. 264). But his attempt to cast the issues in terms of
“guardian review” may obscure the fundamental truth in the conventional account: At the time of
Lochner the Court tended to be dominated by justices who regarded laissez-faire as the natural order of
economic relationships, and regarded it as proper for them to be aggressive in striking down attempts
to interfere with that order. By the 1930s justices who did not regard laissez-faire as holding a privileged
constitutional status, and who believed they should be deferential to governmental attempts to
regulate the economy, had gained the upper hand. Thus, even if it is true in some sense that the judges
who decided West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), conceptualized the case “as a
boundary-pricking police power case, identical in form to Lochner” (p. 265), that is a truth without
much substantive content. And White’s rather mystifying comment that “[b]y 1937, when the Parrish
case was decided, the state of the Court’s liberty of contract jurisprudence remained relatively
unchanged from that when Lochner was decided” (p. 253) can be accepted only by concentrating on the
form of the opinions and not on the sea change in substance reflected in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934).
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or in contravention of, the provisions of the
Constitution; and, having done that, its duty
ends.

Roberts included this passage in one of his
most rightward-looking opinions, United
States v. Butler.18 But it must be remembered
that he was a key player in the constitutional
transformation. In Home Building  Loan
Association v. Blaisdell,19 which White appropriately uses to show the clash of modes of
interpreting the Constitution, Roberts had
provided the critical vote favoring Hughes’s
modernist opinion over George Sutherland’s
traditionalist one.20 He had written the
distinctly modernist Nebbia v. New York,21 a
critical decision that rejected the doctrine
that there was a “closed class or category of
businesses affected with a public interest”
that could be subjected to price regulation.22
He joined the liberal majority in all the great
cases during the climactic spring of 1937, and
signed on with no more apparent hesitation
than any other member of the Court to the
pair of cases that consolidated the development of Commerce Clause doctrine, United

States v. Darby23 and Wickard v. Filburn.24
Thus, the Butler passage, in which he
expresses quite clearly a separation between
the sources of law and its expositors, must be
regarded not as the ravings of a traditionalist
detached from reality but as a reflection of
the ambivalence and tension felt by a real
judge respecting the force of doctrine even as
he helped to reshape it.
Consider finally Justice Jackson, the author
of Wickard. Drawing on work by Cushman,
White invests that decision with great significance. It is true that Wickard, by holding that
Congress could regulate the amount of wheat
consumed on the farm, pushed Congress’s
power to regulate commerce quite far – though
not unreasonably, in my view. It is also true that
Jackson, a judge who reveled in second
thoughts,25 mused about taking the position
that “the commerce clause is what the Congress
says it is” (p. 231). But the opinion he actually
wrote for the Court said and did no such thing.
He reviewed the course of precedent with
respect, did not try to detach the scope of federal powers from the language of the Commerce Clause, and applied a flexible doctrinal

18 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936).
19 290 U.S. 238 (1934).
20 White says, “Upholding the Minnesota [mortgage moratorium] statute challenged in Blaisdell could
only mean that the Contracts Clause of the Constitution did not mean in 1934 what it had meant for
the past 150 years” (pp. 212-13). Incidentally, Hughes signed on to Roberts’ opinion in Butler,
including the passage quoted above.
21 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
22 Rather, he said, “[t]he phrase ‘affected with a public interest’ can, in the nature of things, mean no
more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good.” Id. at 536.
Moreover, he recognized broad legislative discretion in determining whether such control was
justified. Id. at 537, 539. In describing the advent of judicial modernism, White gives much more
prominence to West Coast Hotel Co. than to Nebbia, but it seems to me that – though the political
impact of Parrish was greater, in part because it dealt with a minimum wage law and in part because
it was decided during the Court-packing crisis – the opinion in Parrish had rather little to do but
stand on Nebbia’s shoulders. For example, White says that after Parrish, “liberty of contract had
ceased to be a fixed principle of republican government” and that “police power cases would no
longer be considered against a backdrop of essentialist spheres and boundary lines” (p. 223). But
these points – which had strong antecedents – had been made clear by Nebbia.
23 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
24 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
25 See, e.g., McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 176-78 (1950) (concurring).
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test that had strong roots in opinions dating to
the early part of the century.26 Although for the
following half-century the Court never held
that Congress had overextended its reach
under the Clause, even during that era Congress, legislatures, and courts always felt the
need to establish a relationship between the
activities being regulated and interstate commerce. Moreover, a doctrine of extreme judicial
self-abnegation, which is what the Commerce
Clause cases culminating in Wickard established, hardly reflects an attitude that the
expositors of the law are fully in control of it.
On the contrary, by according Congress quite a
free hand, these cases narrowly confined the
power of the courts, and that is probably a large
part of the reason this doctrine remained
remarkably stable for more than fifty years.


White says that one of his aims is to “complicate” the conventional account of constitutional change in the New Deal era (p. 12), and
he has succeeded. He lends considerable

weight to those who resist the seductive political account of the great constitutional transformation. He argues forcefully that the
conventional account “has been an exercise in
‘winners’ history’” (p. 308), and he presents the
interesting hypothesis that, though the New
Deal represents “the midpoint of a crisis in
early twentieth-century American jurisprudence,” it “had its own parochial flavor and its
own discrete constitutional issues, which can
be seen as distinct from, and not in themselves
more significant than, the constitutional issues
that were central to the 1920s or to the 1950s”
(p. 310). And yet to gain a fuller understanding
of the sea change that occurred in the years
surrounding 1937, one must complicate the
account even more. It is not enough to consider
the political, intellectual, and even doctrinal
context in which the Court worked. One must
also delve deeply into each of the significant
cases, attempting to determine the combination of doctrine, politics, ideology, temperament, and idiosyncrasy that led each of the nine
men who constituted the Court to act in the
way he did. B

26 See 317 U.S. at 125 (“But even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce ...”). Compare, e.g., Southern Railway v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26
(1911) (per Van Devanter, J.) (“a real or substantial relation or connection”); Houston, E.  W.T.R. Co.
v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 355 (1914) (per Hughes, J.) (Congress’ “control over the interstate
carrier in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is
necessary or appropriate to exercise the control for the effective government of that commerce”).
White says that Hughes’ opinion in NLRB v. Jones  Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), “employed
traditional Commerce Clause formulas contextually to sustain a relatively broad application of federal
commerce powers” (p. 228). In a sense that is true – as it was also true of Darby and Wickard – because
the “close and substantial” test applied by the Jones  Laughlin Court, 301 U.S. at 37, was already a
familiar one. White’s suggestion that until Darby the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
adhered to “categorical formulas” (p. 228) seems to fly in the face of Hughes’ insistence in Jones 
Laughlin (in contrast to the position taken a year earlier in Carter) that “[t]he question is necessarily
one of degree.” 301 U.S. at 37.
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